In book: The Gulf War and the New World Order, Edition: softback, Chapter: The New World Order, Publisher: Zed Books, Editors: Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, pp Am completing manuscript on history of Zionism as a Colonial Settler state. The media war - USA vs. EU. THE. NEW WORLD. ORDER. Whether it is attainable, how it can be attained, and what sort world peace; already we have had far too much abolition of war. The key to understanding the meaning behind all of these symbols is found in the translation

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NEW. WORLD. ORDER by. A. Ralph Epperson. (This material has been reconstructed () from various sources on the internet; and grateful thanks is given. FINAL WARNING: A History of the New World Order. In , a group of international bankers secretly met on a small island off the coast of Georgia. Their plan. A. Ralph Epperson The New World Order Pdf. Topics The new world order. Collectionopensource. LanguageEnglish. A must reading book.

In the context of the entire chapter in which He spoke these words, Jesus meant that these signs would mean that the second coming of Christ is near. Many Christians today are convinced that Christ will return in the very near future. If this is true, then the Bible's prediction of the reign of the antichrist over a new world order is also about to happen.

I believe the terrible depression and the devastating natural catastrophes that I described earlier in this book will propel the world into the coming one-world government far more rapidly than today's most ardent proponent of a new world order would dare to dream about.

Fortunately, there is hope. For out of the chaos of these calamities, and out of the ruins of the antichrist's new world order, God Himself will establish the ultimate "new world order" that will last forever.

However, all of this is getting ahead of our story. It will take the rest of this book to develop these thoughts. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, the story began many millenniums ago in a part of the universe that is hundreds, perhaps millions, of light years away from planet Earth. As it plunged toward the earth, an asteroid a mile in diameter would create a fireball hundreds of miles in diameter. The Idaho Statesman, 1 July , 3A. Sooner or later, our planet will be struck by one of them" Newsweek, 23 Nov.

Yeoman's opinion is shared by nearly all scientists who have studied asteroids. It's not a question of whether, they say, but only of when, another major asteroid will strike planet Earth. Chapter 2 Who Is the Antichrist?

In the film, Ben Kenobi and Luke Sky walker are among the last survivors of a race of good warriors called the Jedi. An Evil Empire has destroyed their planet, killed off the rest of the Jedi, and is seeking to destroy Ben and Luke.

In due time the pair find themselves trapped with their friends inside the Evil Empire's monster spaceship. In a hand-to-hand fight with Darth Vader, the sinister leader of the Evil Empire, Ben Kenobi sacrifices his life, making it possible for Luke Sky walker and the other survivors of the Jedi to escape. Luke Sky walker and his companions are still not safe, though, because the Evil Empire takes after them in hot pursuit.

From their base on a distant planet, Luke Skywalker attacks the Evil Empire's spaceship at its one vulnerable point and destroys it, ending the drama. The most striking aspect of Star Wars is the close similarity between the film and the conflict between good and evil that has been going on in the universe for thousands of years. You and I see this conflict alive in our neighborhoods and even in our own lives.

And, as in Star Wars, evil seems to have the upper hand. The more prisons we build, the more criminals there are to fill them. For every plug the government jams in the dike to stop the torrent of cocaine and marijuana gushing into the country, the drug lords blast two more.

Human passions seem impossible to control - a fact that is evident not only in the riots that occasionally erupt in our cities, but in the everyday events in the lives of millions of addicted, depressed, angry people.

Where Did Evil Come From? How did this happen? Where did it all begin? Did God plan for our world to be like this, or, as in Star Wars, is there a sinister "evil empire" behind it all? The Bible has an explanation. Its story also begins a long time ago in a "galaxy" far, far away called heaven. These are the opening words in Revelation's chilling account: There was war in heaven. Michael and his angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon and his angels fought back.

But he was not strong enough, and they lost their place in heaven. The great dragon was hurled down - that ancient serpent called the devil or Satan, who leads the whole world astray. He was hurled to the earth, and his angels with him Revelation Notice that Michael leads the forces of justice and right, and Satan leads the forces of evil, and each is supported by other beings called "angels.

He was "anointed as a guardian cherub" who was "on the holy mount of God" and "walked among the fiery stones" Ezekiel At that time he was known as Lucifer, which means "light bearer" see Isaiah , King James Version.

The exalted position Lucifer held suggests that God must have loved him very much. Many people wonder why God created the devil. He didn't. Speaking of Lucifer before his rebellion, the Bible says, "You were blameless in your ways from the day you were created till wickedness was found in you" Ezekiel God created Lucifer a perfect, blameless being.

Lucifer originated sin within his own mind and heart. God didn't put it there. He found it there. This leads us to one of the most important principles that God uses as He directs His efforts to resolve this universal conflict between good and evil: He forces no one. God did not make Lucifer evil. He made him good. However, when Lucifer chose to make himself evil, God did not stop him.

I believe that the ability to understand moral issues, to tell the difference between right and wrong, is one of the chief characteristics that makes humans different from the animals.

Another difference is our ability to choose between right and wrong. Without this ability we would not be human. God has a tremendous respect for the power of choice that He has given to the intelligent beings He created. Each one is free to choose which side he or she will be on. When Lucifer rebelled against God, it was by his own choice. God obviously did not force Lucifer to remain loyal, or there would be no Satan today.

Neither did He force him to rebel, nor did He force the other angels to choose His side or Satan's. Each made his own choice. Why Lucifer Rebelled The next question we need to ask is why Lucifer rebelled.

What was the issue in this conflict between himself and God? Isaiah tells us that Lucifer said in his heart: "I will ascend to heaven; I will raise my throne above the stars of God; I will sit enthroned on the mount of the assembly, on the utmost heights of the sacred mountain.

I will ascend above the tops of the clouds; I will make myself like the Most High" Isaiah , When one person aspires to another's throne, we call it treason - rebellion against the existing government. Apparently Lucifer rebelled against the very government of God!

He rebelled against God's laws and against His authority. He wanted God's position; he wanted to be like God; he wanted to be God. Does the idea that God has a government come as a surprise to you? It shouldn't. Even our science fiction assumes that beings in other parts of the universe have their governments with rulers and subordinates and laws to be obeyed. The Bible makes it clear that Lucifer made a free choice to rebel against the government of God and that a large number of the angels in heaven made a free choice to join him in his rebellion.

The fact that Michael had angels on His side is evidence that many of the angels chose to remain loyal to God's government. Think of how it happens when humans rebel against each other. At first, the issues are unclear, and people are confused about who is right.

However, as time goes on, the issues become more and more clear, and people start taking sides. Opinions harden, till eventually it becomes almost impossible to persuade anyone on either side that the other might be right. That, I believe, is how it happened in heaven. Warfare broke out when Satan and his angels maintained their defiant stand against God's government in spite of the fact that the issues in the conflict had become clear and rebellion was exposed for what it truly was.

Revelation tells us that when rebellion had reached full maturity, Satan "was hurled to the earth, and his angels with him" Revelation , emphasis added. Evil in the World The Bible does not tell us why God chose this earth as the new home for Satan and his angels.

When history in this world ends and life in the next begins, one of the first questions I intend to ask God is why He chose to cast Satan onto our planet. All you and I can do is assume that God in His wisdom knew this was best. They have no programs. That being the case, it's necessary the domestic population has to be kept from looking at, kept from paying attention to it. It has to be diverted to something else. One thing, this is classic in situations like this, one thing you can do is try to divert the attention of the population to conflicts with much weaker enemies.

Now, of course, in order to make this work, you have to turn these much weaker enemies, at least in the propaganda system, you have to portray them as huge monsters who are about ready to wipe us out. You first have to terrorize the domestic population. Make them frightened. Then when you destroy the much weaker enemy you can arouse jingoist hysteria.

In each case, huge chimera were made, a great monster about to destroy us, but finally we got in there just in time and saved ourselves. We can heave a sigh of relief. This was even done in the case of Grenada, first try. Grenada, you remember, was a monstrous superpower [laughter] that had major influence over the world nutmeg trade [laughter] and was literally portrayed as a threat to our existence.

As the United States proceeded to liberate us from this threat the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General More, intoning away in somber sounds on the radio about how, in the event of a Russian attack on Western Europe, Grenada would interdict the supply lines between the Caribbean and Western Europe and without oil from the region our leaders would be lost.

And it was reinforced and magnified. Sober scholars called upon by the media, not to explain in the same profound fury, I forget what they were called, great stores of weapons found on Grenada afterwards showing that we got there in time before they were about to do something really serious. But we made it. And as Ronald Reagan put it, we were "standing tall" and had overcome the Vietnam syndrome with this glorious victory. During this campaign [the Gulf war] I again, in another weak moment, tuned into to NPR and heard General Schwarzkopf giving a briefing.

He was some kind of officer during this great work [Grenada], and he explained, he was asked, How come with your brilliant generalship we were able to succeed in conquering, driving Iraq from Kuwait so well?

And he said, Well, in the case of Grenada, we learned some lessons. One of the lessons we learned is that the Cubans fought much harder than we expected. Now, look back to recall there were about, I think it was 43 or so Cuban paramilitary forces, construction workers that knew how to fire a rifle or something. They were attacked by elite U. Frankly we didn't expect it. And of course that was one lesson we learned, one can't take chances. And that was the first thing we did with Iraq was carpet bombing to make sure there was nothing would be left except broken bodies, and so on, when our soldiers went on what some of them called their nature walk.

But these lessons were learned. If you want to be a great hero and a great general, you want to make sure we don't make the same mistake we made in Grenada.

I should perhaps mention, that there too, the war took place on exactly the grounds that are explained in the Policy Review: no negotiations, a much weaker enemy, pulverize them. The Cubans, these fierce Cubans, that fought back when the U. They had announced to the United States a couple of days earlier when the crisis began to develop, that Cuba would have no objection to the United States landing forces at the famous airport to bring out the medical students who, in fact, were under no attack, but no claim had been made that they were under threat.

That offer was made on October It received no response from the United States. In fact, there was no response to that offer for five days until after U. Cuba did announce that if its forces, its paramilitary construction workers were fired upon, they would fire back. After U. When a few mavericks in the press asked what the problem was and how come they didn't recognize the offer before, to land the airplanes at the airport to take the medical students out, what's the problem, the answer was, well, we didn't have good communication.

Communication lines were down. You know, the country was backward. A country with poor technology like ours had trouble getting back to the Cubans for five days. I guess there was a shortage of carrier pigeons in the embassy.

The right lessons are taught by a show of force, in particular the show of force against a much weaker enemy. The same story was played against Libya and international terrorism and again, the domestic population was properly terrified. Remember back in when this hysteria reached its peak, the tourism industry in Europe was destroyed because Americans were too afraid to travel in Europe. They were too afraid to travel in Europe where they would be about one hundred times as safe as they would be in any American city.

They were terrorized, frightened that there would be crazed Arabs springing at them from every place, and tourism collapsed. In the case of Panama, after all just a year ago, remember General Noriega, a minor thug, was converted into a figure larger than life, trying to undermine our whole society and way of life by narcoterrorism and therefore we were saved just in time.

Frightened, we breathed a sigh of relief that he was out of the way. In the case of Iraq, there was a huge disinformation effort. It's now practically conceded that all those fanciful tales about tremendous fortifications, hundreds of thousands of troops dug in a half a mile underground, artillery that can shoot all the way to who knows where, chemical weapons, was all a farce.

They knew it was a farce. Again, the domestic population was properly terrorized. Once again people were afraid to travel. This caused quite a bit of ridicule in Europe. Even in England, where the right-wing press was thought of as rather comical, the Spectator, a right-wing journal, pointed out in one of its columns that some group of American gun collectors, guys that walk around with assault rifles and that thing, cancelled a conference in Scotland [laughter] worrying about their airplane.

The picture that was presented, and it's worth paying attention to, it's serious, there's a reason behind this, the picture was presented to the American public, drilled into their heads, week after week, that this huge colossus was about to conquer the world, taking control of the world's oil, ready to march onward destroying us, suffering people groaning at his feet, pleading with somebody to save them.

Nobody else had the courage to do it. We moved in finally because we had the guts. We saved the world. We saved ourselves. We saved them, just in time. If this picture of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is true, and if we were to meet the threat posed by Iraq acting our part as defender of the world, then the conclusion that we should have moved in by force, and fast, and not waited, that's not a unreasonable conclusion. Think that through and you'll see that critics of the war and supporters of the war shared pretty much the same moral ground.

I think that's an important thing. They differed in their picture of the world. Their picture differed in whether they were looking at reality or the abuse of reality, but it's hard to On almost any issue you can think of an edifice of lies has been constructed so extensive that, before you can have a rational discussion, you have to sort of clear away the rubble.

And that better be done or we will see more and more of this. Well, all of these things that I've been talking about are important features of the real world, the actual one. The domestic population and the world have to be intimidated. The domestic population has to be taught to "respect the martial virtues", as the Washington Post put it. We have to shed the dread Vietnam syndrome. We have to overcome what Reagan intellectual Norman Podhoretz called "our sickly inhibition against the use of military force.

At home the population has to be in fear, has to be cowering in terror, in fear of terrible enemies about to destroy us. The world has to be put on notice that the surly master will do what it wants. The intellectuals have the responsibility to conceal all of this in beguiling rhetoric. If this picture looks familiar, it's because it is familiar. And that's worth thinking about, too.

Events in the Gulf followed the script in the National Security Review quite closely. Let's review them quickly. Now actually, in , Iraq was a close Russian ally. But Ronald Reagan and George Bush recognized quickly that Saddam Hussein is our kind of guy and they moved quickly to change that and by the Iraqi regime was very much Western oriented. Of course, Saddam Hussein was recognized to be a murderous gangster who had imposed one of the worst tyrannies in the world, but that was not a big problem, it looked like he was our gangster, so that was quite all right.

The Reagan-Bush Administration fought very hard to prevent any condemnation of his atrocious human rights record in Congress, and in particular, in any interference in the growing trade in aid that they were lavishing upon their friend.

The United States became the leading market for Iraqi exports, oil. Iraq became the first or second largest recipient of credits for U. As Iraq began turning toward Western corporations and governments for its military support, Western German corporations took the lead in providing the lead in supplying that military equipment.

The Iraqi democratic opposition, not a radical movement, incidentally, bankers, engineers and people like that for the most part, they were continually rebuffed in Washington. Last February, according to Iraqi and government sources, they came to the White House with a plea for support for a simple statement calling for parliamentary democracy in Iraq.

They were rebuffed. You will notice, incidentally, that from August through March, through the end of the war, there was nothing in the press, nothing in the media about the Iraqi democratic opposition, none of their statements, none of their spokespeople cited. It's kind of interesting if you think about it.

These are the forces that for years have fought against Saddam Hussein and called for democracy in Iraq, parliamentary democracy. And there are lots of them. Of course, they don't function inside Iraq.

They can't. Under the kind of regime we like to support they'd be killed if they did that. What they did was this, they exist in Europe, in England. You can read their statements in the German press, in the British press and so on, not in the American press. I haven't found a word referring to them. They continue to be rebuffed by the media and by the Government just as they had during the period when Saddam Hussein was George Bush's great friend and the reason is obvious when you look at their statements.

Yes, they were opposed to Saddam Hussein, but they were opposed to the war. They didn't want to see their country destroyed. They wanted a peaceful settlement and knew that it was possible. In fact, their position was indistinguishable from that of the American peace movement.

I managed to sneak one of their spokesmen into an MIT teach-in and you couldn't tell the difference between his position and any other opponents to the war. Well, that fact had to be obscured in the press and it's done, another great propaganda achievement. Well, that's pre-July. In July Saddam Hussein again made it pretty clear that he was turning his forces toward Kuwait and was making moves that were, clearly, very intimidating towards Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

That was quite OK. True, he was a murderous thug, but remember, he was our thug. That was July. Well, we can speculate about what happened next. Conservative speculation, one that I think is plausible myself, is that Saddam Hussein misinterpreted the signals, took it to be a green light to take over Kuwait, which he did on August 2nd, and that is unacceptable.

That shifted him from being a murderous thug, which is quite OK by our standards, to an independent thug, which is not OK at all. In fact, if he was an independent boy scout, it's the same. So then we turn to the familiar script, the one announced in the Policy Review, and consistently used in the case of independent nationalists, those who do not understand that their role is to follow orders. Kill, gas, torture, terrorize, do anything you like, but don't step on our toes.

That's the lesson that people in the Third World have to understand and he demonstrated that he needed understanding. Well, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was certainly not the only case. It's within the range of many recent examples of aggression, some worse than others. World opinion responds the way it always does. The general response of the world community to aggression through the United Nations is sanctions, which means sanctions and diplomacy. Diplomacy was to achieve reversal of the aggression through diplomatic means.

And in this case the sanctions approach had unusual prospects for success. The reasons were two. For one thing, the sanctions were of absolutely unprecedented severity.

Never before had there been, even in cases of much worse acts of aggression and atrocities than this, there have not been sanctions on food and medicine. But the second and more important reason why sanctions would be highly likely to work was that for once they were going to hold. Usually sanctions do not hold. Usually, in fact, they're vetoed. Efforts to imposed sanctions are usually, simply vetoed by the great powers, the United States far in the lead.

Just taking the twenty years since George Bush enters the scene, the United States is first by a long shot in vetoing Security Council resolutions on aggression or any relevant issue.

In second place, with about half the number of vetoes of the United States is Britain, our lieutenant. The United States and Britain are responsible for about 80 percent of those. In third place, far behind, is France, and fourth place is the Soviet Union. It's less than a third the number of vetoes of Great Britain and about one seventh the number of vetoes of the United States.

A. Ralph Epperson The New World Order Pdf

That, incidentally, tells you how likely we are to be entering a New World Order in which the United Nations will undertake a peace-keeping role with the Russian veto no longer blocking it. These trivial facts, and they are trivial, you'll have to search very far to find any reference to them in the journals of opinion, intellectual journals, media, and so on.

In fact, you'll find no reference to them anywhere near the main stream, but they are important facts. And that's why sanctions usually don't work because they get blocked, usually by the United States, second England. On the rare occasions where sanctions are allowed to go through, for instance, in Southern Africa, first of all they're much weaker, and secondly, they're not enforced because they've been broken consistently, regularly, by the United States, Britain, France and their allies.

As a result the sanctions were very weak in their impact. In this particular case these sanctions would hold. First of all they weren't vetoed. Secondly they would hold.

The usual sanctions busters weren't going to violate them. And there was every likelihood from the first day that sanctions would be highly effective, but remember, the policy principle is no diplomacy, no negotiations.

In the case of a much weaker enemy, you have to destroy them, then pulverize them and do it fast, so no sanctions. The United States and Britain therefore took the second course distinct from that of the general world community.

They moved at once to block negotiations, in fact, to undercut sanctions and to narrow the options for the use of force. George Bush made it very clear in August that there would be no negotiations, no diplomacy, that the options would be either capitulation to force, or the use of force, and you'll notice that is in precisely in accord with the prescription of the Policy Review.

Now by late August this was becoming a serious problem. He had a column in which he said that is necessary to block the diplomatic track because pursuit of the diplomatic track "might defuse the crisis at the cost of a few token gains for Iraq. And these were well within the range of negotiations. But you got to block the diplomatic track because it might succeed. In fact, at that point it was becoming pretty dangerous because there was every reason to think it would succeed.

In fact, there was every reason to think that the sanctions had already worked. This is late August. Right at that time a former high U. That would mean some kind of lease over two uninhabited islands that had been assigned to Kuwait by Britain in the Imperial settlement precisely for the purpose of keeping Iraq landlocked. Well, that was dangerous. Looked like there really was a settlement, but we can't be certain that the Iraqi offer was serious. Of course you can determine whether an offer is serious by pursuing it.

But the U. It was rejected flat out of hand and basically eliminated from public discussion. So that matter continued. There's no time to go through the record here, but let's take the last known case on January 2nd.

Well, that was rejected flat. George Bush's response to that was there will be no negotiations. Interesting fact is that, at that time, according to the polls, about two-thirds of the U. That's without knowing that such an offer was on the table and without even seeing any discussion that it might be a good idea.

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Remember the order from Washington was no linkage, and therefore every respectable intellectual had to parrot on command, no linkage, and they all did. No linkage means no diplomacy. It's interesting that even without knowing that the offer was on the table from Iraq, and without knowing that U. You can simply imagine what the whole results would have been if people knew the facts. And that's why it's so important for the media and the educated classes to fulfill their function and to prevent any knowledge of the abuse of reality, the real facts.

So matters went. On February 15th there was another Iraqi offer to withdraw, immediately rejected. Mistranslated, incidentally, crucially, to make it look much harsher than it was. On February 22nd there was the Soviet-Iraqi offer. To terminate the press without any further instructions George Bush quickly rejected it, instantaneously, imposing conditions so absurd that it must have taken some self-discipline for the media to not raise an eyebrow.

I mean, that is a proposal so insane that it obviously couldn't be considered for a moment except by a well disciplined, intellectual class who accepted it completely, and if you look back in the press during that period [applause] So the result of all of this without being perfidious, it's an interesting conclusion about the New World Order, the conclusion's straightforward, is that no reason was ever given for going to war, that is, no reason which could not be instantaneously refuted by a literate teenager [laughter] and that's an important fact.

That's another typical hallmark of a totalitarian society and it's worth recognizing that's what happened. Now, of course, there was an official reason given. The official reason was that aggressors cannot be rewarded and that aggression must be quickly punished. It's interesting that instead of collapsing in ridicule when George Bush presented this claim, the media praised him in awe for his high principle.

The New World Order

I won't insult your intelligence by running through the directory of how the United States and George Bush in particular has stood behind these principles. But again, that's the hallmark of totalitarian society, totalitarian culture, you begin to see how close we manage to approximate it without any state controls of any significant kind whatsoever.

Now, occasionally more serious intellectuals try to deal with the question of sanctions, they're all worth looking at, so the New York Review of Books, that thinker's guide, featured an article by Timothy Garton Ash, a British intellectual, and he, at last, does deal with this hard question, how come we could agree to sanctions in other cases -- he doesn't mention the fact that we usually reject sanctions because we support aggression but that's going too far -- so how come we could set sanctions in other cases but not in this case?

He asks how come we could accept sanctions in the case of Southern Africa and the Communists in Eastern Europe, but not in the case of Saddam Hussein? And his answer is, well, in the case of Southern African racists and East European Communists sanctions would work, but in the case of Saddam Hussein they wouldn't.

That's the end of his argument. Putting aside a number of questions, like the fact that we didn't really support the sanctions against Southern Africa, what's the difference?

Why are the South Africans racists and the East Europeans Communists nice guys, like us, while Saddam Hussein isn't a nice guy like us? No answer is given, but if you look at the color of their faces I think you can see an answer. The same is true when the New York Times tells us that "the world is united against Saddam Hussein," or that "Saddam Hussein is the most hated man in the world.

An attack on Iraq would certainly shatter Bush's alliance, they assert, predicting calls from United Nations Security Council members saying that diplomacy should have been given more time and that they will not wish to allow a course of action "that leaves America sitting too prettily as sole remaining superpower". When the unanimity of the Security Council ends, "all that lovely talk about the new world order" will too.

When casualties mount, "Bush will be called a warmonger, an imperialist and a bully". The article goes on to say that Bush and James Baker 's speechifying cannot save the new world order once they launch a controversial war. It closes noting that a wide consensus is not necessary for U.

The rest need only not interfere.

Bush told him that it was important that we get full implementation on every United Nations resolution: "If we compromise, we weaken the UN and our own credibility in building this new world order," I said. Bush feared that Javier will be cover for Hussein's manipulations. John Lewis Gaddis , a Cold War historian, wrote in Foreign Affairs about what he saw as the key characteristics of the potential new order, namely unchallenged American primacy, increasing integration, resurgent nationalism and religiosity, a diffusion of security threats and collective security.

He casts the fundamental challenge as one of integration versus fragmentation and the concomitant benefits and dangers associated with each. Changes in communications , the international economic system, the nature of security threats and the rapid spread of new ideas would prevent nations from retreating into isolation. In light of this, Gaddis sees a chance for the democratic peace predicted by liberal international relations theorists to come closer to reality.

However, he illustrates that not only is the fragmentary pressure of nationalism manifest in the former Communist bloc countries and the Third World , but it is also a considerable factor in the West. Further, a revitalized Islam could play both integrating and fragmenting roles—emphasizing common identity, but also contributing to new conflicts that could resemble the Lebanese Civil War.

The integration coming from the new order could also aggravate ecological , demographic and epidemic threats. National self-determination , leading to the breakup and reunification of states such as Yugoslavia on one hand and Germany on the other could signal abrupt shifts in the balance of power with a destabilizing effect.

Integrated markets, especially energy markets, are now a security liability for the world economic system as events affecting energy security in one part of the globe could threaten countries far removed from potential conflicts. Finally, diffusion of security threats required a new security paradigm involving low-intensity, but more frequent deployment of peacekeeping troops—a type of mission that is hard to sustain under budgetary or public opinion pressure.

Gaddis called for aid to Eastern European countries, updated security and economic regimes for Europe, United Nations-based regional conflict resolution, a slower pace of international economic integration and paying off the U. Furthermore, he asserted that it was only as an unintended postscript to Desert Storm that Bush gave meaning to the "new world order" slogan. By the end of the year, Bush stopped talking about a new world order and his advisers explained that he had dropped the phrase because he felt it suggested more enthusiasm for the changes sweeping the planet than he actually felt.

As an antidote to the uncertainties of the world, he wanted to stress the old verities of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and international stability. The economic downturn took a deeper psychological toll than expected while domestic politics were increasingly frustrated by paralysis, with the result that the United States toward the end of turned increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic.

However, this success of this order was not a fait accomplis. In her view, the new order was not a liberal institutionalist one, but one in which state authority disaggregated and decentralized in the face of globalization.

Political and intellectual leaders elaborated similar views. The Berlin wall had come down, communist regimes had collapsed, the United Nations was to assume a new importance, the former Cold War rivals would engage in "partnership" and a "grand bargain," peacekeeping and peacemaking would be the order of the day.

The President of the world's leading country proclaimed the "new world order" The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of harmony, which was soon revealed to be exactly that. The world became different in the early s, but not necessarily more peaceful. Change was inevitable; progress was not The illusion of harmony at the end of that Cold War was soon dissipated by the multiplication of ethnic conflicts and " ethnic cleansing ," the breakdown of law and order, the emergence of new patterns of alliance and conflict among states, the resurgence of neo- communist and neo-fascist movements, intensification of religious fundamentalism , the end of the "diplomacy of smiles" and " policy of yes " in Russia's relations with the West, the inability of the United Nations and the United States to suppress bloody local conflicts, and the increasing assertiveness of a rising China.

In the five years after the Berlin wall came down, the word " genocide " was heard far more often than in any five years of the Cold War. The one harmonious world paradigm is clearly far too divorced from reality to be a useful guide to the post—Cold War world.

Two Worlds: Us and Them. While one-world expectations appear at the end of major conflicts, the tendency to think in terms of two worlds recurs throughout human history. People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians. The essence of Clinton's election year critique was that Bush had done too little, not too much.

Commenting on the U. The "New World Order" is precisely this: an international regime of unrelenting pressure and intimidation by the most powerful capitalist states against the weakest. It was replaced by competing similar concepts about how the post-Cold War order would develop. Prominent among these were the ideas of the "era of globalization ", the "unipolar moment", the "end of history" and the " Clash of Civilizations ". Their conclusion was that Bush really only ever had three firm aspects to the new world order: Checking the offensive use of force.

Promoting collective security. Using great power cooperation. These were not developed into a policy architecture, but came about incrementally as a function of domestic, personal and global factors. Because of the somewhat overblown expectations for the new world order in the media, Bush was widely criticized for lacking vision.

The authors note that before the crisis the concept remained "ambiguous, nascent, and unproven" and that the U. S had not assumed a leadership role with respect to the new order. Essentially, the Cold War's end was the permissive cause for the new world order, but the Persian Gulf crisis was the active cause.

Bush They reveal that in August U. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Charles W. Freeman Jr. Bush would then refer to the "new world order" at least 42 times from the summer of to the end of March They also note that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney gave three priorities to the Senate on fighting the Persian Gulf War, namely prevent further aggression, protect oil supplies and further a new world order.

The authors note that the new world order did not emerge in policy speeches until after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, maintaining that the concept was clearly not critical in the U. John H. Sununu later indicated that the administration wanted to refrain from talking about the concept until Soviet collapse was more clear.

A reversal of Soviet collapse would have been the death knell for the new order. They did not intend to suggest that the U. They preferred multilateralism , but did not reject unilateralism. The new world order did not signal peace, but a "challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay".

Baker recalls that UNSCR 's "language was simply and crystal clear, purposely designed by us to frame the vote as being for or against aggression". Bush's motivation centered around 1 the dangers of appeasement ; and 2 failure to check aggression could spark further aggression.

Bush repeatedly invoked images of World War II in this connection and became very emotional over Iraqi atrocities being committed in Kuwait. He also believed that failure to check Iraqi aggression would lead to more challenges to the U.

While the end of the Cold War increased U. Furthermore, Washington believed that addressing the Iraqi threat would help reassert U.

As a model for dealing with aggressors, Scowcroft believed that the United States ought to act in a way that others can trust and thus get United Nations support. It was critical that the U.Hence, what is actually needed in intra-state conflicts is proper peace building efforts that complement peacekeeping. All such precautions, however, have done nothing to prevent the establishment of an actual New World Order on American soil.

We as a Union were slow to adapt, focusing on attempting to solve the problem and salvage personnel and hypertechnology. Many critics, nevertheless, see to the neokolonialismus as one main cause for the re- flashing of terrorism in the 21 century.

By far, the international community has been relatively successful in deploying peacekeeping forces in violent internal conflicts, whereby such conflicts were tried to be controlled. Other countries have turned to American military protection.

MARINE from Fort Walton Beach
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